Thanks Chaliser

Subj: [snow-news] Reporting on the 'Waldorf transcripts' as of June 2
Date: 6/2/03 4:52:45 PM Pacific Daylight Time
From: jensenmk@plu.edu
To: snow-news@lists.riseup.net


[Below are six pieces related to the 'Waldorf transcripts' from The=20
Guardian, which Sam Smith calls 'the best daily newspaper in the world.'

The first of these articles broke the story by reporting on the
existence of secret transcripts of a Feb. 4 meeting at the Waldorf Hotel
in New York between Colin Powell and Jack Straw, revealing their doubts
about the reliability of the intelligence information by which the war
in Iraq war was justified.

The second piece report's Jack Straw's denial that he met with Colin=20
Powell on Feb. 4, but the Guardian's 'diplomatic sources' remained=20
'adamant' that the 'Waldorf transcripts' are accurate.

In the third piece, a British MP compares the scandal to Watergate, and
Straw denies the meeting, but not the substance of the transcript.

In the fourth article, a former international development secretary=20
accuses Blair of lying to his cabinet.

The fifth piece, only tangentially related, reports on a new US News &
World Report article on Colin Powell's preparations for the Feb. 5 UN=20
address and reports he exclaimed 'I'm not reading this. This is
bullshit' at one point on Feb. 1.

The sixth piece gives extracts of editorial comments in British newspapers.

Meanwhile, as of June 2, the NY Times has not mentioned the 'Waldorf=20
transcripts' (in today's paper William Safire says: 'There was no=20
"intelligence hoax."'), and the Washington Post has not mentioned the=20
'Waldorf transcripts' either.

In fact, the Google news search function suggests that no American news
source has reported on the 'Waldorf transcripts,' although they have=20
been reported by The Hindu, The Taipei Times, The Times of India, The=20
Age (Australia), Khalifah.com.

It cannot be said that American media are completely ignoring the story,
though. In a June 2 article posted a few hours ago, CNN makes only the
following obscure allusion to the 'Waldorf transcpripts' in the
following sentence: "The official would not comment on the various news
accounts of what transpired in meetings leading up to Powell's U.N.=20
presentation . . . ."
(http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/06/02/sprj.irq.wmd.us.intel/index.html).

–Mark]

1.

STRAW, POWELL HAD SERIOUS DOUBTS OVER THEIR IRAQI WEAPONS
CLAIMS
By Dan Plesch and Richard Norton-Taylor

** Secret transcript revealed **

The Guardian
May 31, 2003

http://politics.guardian.co.uk/iraq/story/0,12956,967549,00.html

Jack Straw and his US counterpart, Colin Powell, privately expressed=20
serious doubts about the quality of intelligence on Iraq's banned=20
weapons programme at the very time they were publicly trumpeting it to
get UN support for a war on Iraq, the Guardian has learned.

Their deep concerns about the intelligence - and about claims being made
by their political bosses, Tony Blair and George Bush - emerged at a=20
private meeting between the two men shortly before a crucial UN security
council session on February 5.

The meeting took place at the Waldorf hotel in New York, where they=20
discussed the growing diplomatic crisis. The exchange about the validity
of their respective governments' intelligence reports on Iraq lasted=20
less than 10 minutes, according to a diplomatic source who has read a=20
transcript of the conversation.

The foreign secretary reportedly expressed concern that claims being=20
made by Mr Blair and President Bush could not be proved. The problem,=20
explained Mr Straw, was the lack of corroborative evidence to back up=20
the claims.

Much of the intelligence were assumptions and assessments not supported
by hard facts or other sources.

Mr Powell shared the concern about intelligence assessments, especially
those being presented by the Pentagon's office of special plans set up
by the US deputy defence secretary, Paul Wolfowitz.

Mr Powell said he had all but "moved in" with US intelligence to prepare
his briefings for the UN security council, according to the transcripts.

But he told Mr Straw he had come away from the meetings "apprehensive"
about what he called, at best, circumstantial evidence highly tilted in
favour of assessments drawn from them, rather than any actual raw=20
intelligence.

Mr Powell told the foreign secretary he hoped the facts, when they came
out, would not "explode in their faces".

What are called the "Waldorf transcripts" are being circulated in Nato
diplomatic circles. It is not being revealed how the transcripts came to
be made; however, they appear to have been leaked by diplomats who=20
supported the war against Iraq even when the evidence about Saddam=20
Hussein's programme of weapons of mass destruction was fuzzy, and who=20
now believe they were lied to.

People circulating the transcripts call themselves "allied sources=20
supportive of US war aims in Iraq at the time".

The transcripts will fuel the controversy in Britain and the US over=20
claims that London and Washington distorted and exaggerated the
intelligence assessments about Saddam's nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons programme.

An unnamed intelligence official told the BBC on Thursday that a key=20
claim in the dossier on Iraq's weapons released by the British
government last September - that Iraq could launch a chemical or
biological attack within 45 minutes of an order - was inserted on the=20
instructions of officials in 10 Downing Street.

Adam Ingram, the armed forces minister, admitted the claim was made by
"a single source; it wasn't corroborated".

Speaking yesterday in Warsaw, the Polish capital, Mr Blair said the=20
evidence of weapons of mass destruction in the dossier was "evidence the
truth of which I have absolutely no doubt about at all".

He said he had consulted the heads of the security and intelligence=20
services before emphatically denying that Downing Street had leaned on
them to strengthen their assessment of the WMD threat in Iraq. He=20
insisted he had "absolutely no doubt" that proof of banned weapons would
eventually be found in Iraq. Whitehall sources make it clear they do not
share the prime minister's optimism.

The Waldorf transcripts are all the more damaging given Mr Powell's=20
dramatic 75-minute speech to the UN security council on February 5, when
he presented declassified satellite images, and communications
intercepts of what were purported to be conversations between Iraqi=20
commanders, and held up a vial that, he said, could contain anthrax.

Evidence, he said, had come from "people who have risked their lives to
let the world know what Saddam is really up to".

Some of the intelligence used by Mr Powell was provided by Britain.

The US secretary of state, who was praised by Mr Straw as having made a
"most powerful and authoritative case", also drew links between al-Qaida
and Iraq - a connection dismissed by British intelligence agencies. His
speech did not persuade France, Germany and Russia, who stuck to their
previous insistence that the UN weapons inspectors in Iraq should be=20
given more time to do their job.

The Waldorf meeting took place a few days after Downing Street presented
Mr Powell with a separate dossier on Iraq's banned weapons which he used
to try to strengthen the impact of his UN speech.

A few days later, Downing Street admitted that much of its dossier was
lifted from academic sources and included a plagiarised section written
by an American PhD student.

Mr Wolfowitz set up the Pentagon's office of special plans to counter=20
what he and his boss, Donald Rumsfeld, considered inadequate - and=20
unwelcome - intelligence from the CIA.

He angered critics of the war this week in a Vanity Fair magazine=20
interview in which he cited "bureaucratic reasons" for the White House
focusing on Iraq's alleged arsenal as the reason for the war. In
reality, a "huge" reason for the conflict was to enable the US to=20
withdraw its troops from Saudi Arabia, he said.

Earlier in the week, Mr Rumsfeld suggested that Saddam might have=20
destroyed such weapons before the war.

2.

TRANSCRIPTS RAISE ALARM ACROSS NATO
By Dan Plesch and Richard Norton-Taylor

The Guardian
June 2, 2003

http://politics.guardian.co.uk/iraq/story/0,12956,968605,00.html

Transcripts of a private conversation between Jack Straw and Colin=20
Powell expressing serious doubts about the reliability of intelligence
on Iraq's banned weapons programme are being circulated in western=20
government circles where there is a growing feeling that officials were
deceived into supporting the Iraq war.

A document known as the "Waldorf transcripts" - after the New York hotel
where the US secretary of state was staying before making a crucial=20
speech to the UN security council earlier this year - is described by an
official of one Nato country as "extremely useful".

The description is used in a paper seen by the Guardian as part of an=20
effort among Nato allies to "rein in some of the less acceptable
policies of the Bush administration".

Mr Straw yesterday denied he had had a private meeting with Mr Powell on
February 4, the eve of the security council meeting where Mr Powell gave
a dramatic presentation of intelligence material purporting to reveal=20
hard evidence that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons.

The foreign secretary said he did not arrive in New York until the day
of the crucial security council meeting.

Diplomatic sources remain adamant, as the Guardian reported on Saturday,
that Mr Straw did have a private conversation with Mr Powell in which=20
both men expressed their concerns about the quality of the intelligence
they had been given and how it was being used to bolster their
governments' case for war against Iraq.

The Guardian reported how a meeting between the two men took place at=20
the Waldorf Astoria hotel shortly before the key security council=20
meeting. On Saturday, the Foreign Office insisted "no such meeting" took
place.

Yesterday the foreign secretary was asked on the BBC's Breakfast with=20
Frost Programme if there was "any truth to this: did you in January or
February have any conversation with the secretary of state where you=20
shared your doubts about the strength or probability of the evidence for
the claims you were both making about Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction? Did you have any such conversation?"

Mr Straw replied: "Let me deal with that. No I didn't about the quality
of the evidence. What is the case is that I've always been very anxious
to test the evidence and so, I know, was [Colin] Powell and President=20
Bush and our prime minister, Tony Blair."

The "Waldorf transcripts" document being distributed among Nato capitals
raises new questions about Mr Straw's denials. It is being circulated=20
amid a flurry of leaks in Washington about Mr Powell's concerns about=20
how intelligence was being used to try to persuade reluctant Nato allies
- notably France and Germany - to sanction an attack on Iraq.

Tony Blair has promised to publish a new dossier on Iraq's past weapons
of mass destruction programme. But it is a prospect the intelligence=20
services, already caught up in the political row over claims that=20
Downing Street doctored their earlier evidence, do not relish.

British intelligence agencies cannot substantiate claims that Saddam=20
Hussein possessed chemical and biological weapons when US and UK forces
invaded Iraq, senior Whitehall officials admitted yesterday.

Any dossier published now would be "half-baked and inaccurate", a=20
well-placed source told the Guardian.

"There was a consensus the Iraqis were up to something. We know they had
a programme of deception. We can't substantiate it now."

Intelligence sources said it would take "weeks, if not two or three=20
months" to come up with what they called a "credible" assessment.

British and American intelligence sources say they were expecting Iraqi
forces to use chemical or biological weapons against UK and US troops -
a tactic which, however horrendous, would, they say, at least have=20
proved they had such weapons.

.

GOVERNMENT DEFIANT OVER IRAQI WEAPONS
By Matthew Tempest

** Blair: dossier not doctored ** Straw: threat was
'sufficient' ** Cook: 'momentous blunder by PM **

The Guardian
June 2, 2003

http://politics.guardian.co.uk/iraq/story/0,12956,968826,00.html

Tony Blair today said he stood "absolutely 100%" behind the
intelligence-based evidence the government published on Saddam Hussein's
alleged weapons of mass destruction before the Iraq war.

Following an avalanche of leaks and allegations over the weekend, Mr=20
Blair, speaking at the G8 summit in Evian, France, denied that the=20
government had distorted intelligence concerning the immediacy of the=20
threat posed by Iraqi WMD.

However, when it came to specific denials, Mr Blair's comments were more
qualified. At one point he said: "The idea that we 'doctored'
intelligence reports to invent a notion of a 45-minute capability is=20
completely and totally false."

Critics of the government will argue that the allegation is not that the
reports were invented, merely that information that was not fully=20
substantiated was strongly emphasised at Downing Street's request.

Similarly, Mr Blair seemed to deny point blank Clare Short's weekend=20
allegation that he had made a war pact at his September Camp David=20
summit with the US president, George Bush. However, he actually said it
was "completely and totally untrue" that they had decided to attack "at
a particular time".

Mr Blair ended by pleading for people "to have a little patience".

"There is a process in place," he said.

Earlier the foreign secretary, Jack Straw, retrospectively toned down=20
the government's judgment on the threat posed by Iraq's WMD from
"imminent" to "sufficent".

Under intense questioning from the BBC, Mr Straw refused to use the word
"imminent" and opened up a new line of defence for the US-led
coalition's invasion, saying that UN security council resolution 1441=20
showed the international community agreed Iraq was a genuine threat.

As the row rumbled on during the day, one Labour MP described the row as
potentially "more serious than Watergate."

Malcolm Savidge, one of 73 MPs who have signed a Commons motion calling
for the government's evidence on WMD to be published in full, said: "I
cannot conceive, in fact, of a more serious accusation than that
parliament and the people could have been misled into being brought into
a war on false pretences - that to me is more serious than Watergate."

Another Labour backbencher, Graham Allen, urged parliament to set a=20
deadline of August 20 by which weapons of mass destruction must be found.

The allies would then have had the same amount of time - 110 days - to
find the weapons as they gave to UN weapons inspectors.

He also called for a "thorough and independent inquiry" into the affair.

The Conservatives, scenting political turmoil, have already hinted they
may drop their bipartisan support for the war and back calls for an inquiry.

The foreign secretary also made a deliberately opaque denial of claims
that he had expressed doubts about the the veracity or strength of some
reports of Iraqi WMD with the US secretary of state, Colin Powell, in a
recorded transcript.

Mr Straw dismissed the claim, first made in the Guardian, but only to=20
the extent of repeating that he had not been in New York, let alone the
Waldorf hotel, at the time of the supposed conversation. However, he did
not deny some such discussion took place, saying merely that he would be
very surprised if such a transcript emerged.

Mr Straw also brushed aside calls for an independent inquiry into=20
Britain's justification for war and denied claims by Clare Short, who=20
resigned last month as international development secretary, that the=20
government had "duped" MPs and the public.

Britain entered into the US-led conflict because Saddam posed a
"sufficient threat" to international peace and security, the foreign=20
secretary insisted.

Failing to take action would have allowed the Iraqi leader to use=20
weapons of mass destruction against his own people and neighbouring=20
countries, Mr Straw added.

He said it was "likely" that two trailers found in Iraq had been used as
mobile biological weapons laboratories.

"The evidence is overwhelming and I have got it in front of me and it's
on the website," Mr Straw told BBC Radio 4's Today programme.

"If Saddam had nothing to hide, why had he failed over a 12-year period
to provide answers to these questions?

"Why did he throw out the weapons inspectors at the end of 1998 and=20
refuse to allow them back?

"All the evidence, categorical evidence in this Unmovic document, and=20
the circumstantial evidence of Saddam's own behaviour, pointed to one=20
end, that he did indeed, in the words of security council, pose a threat
to international peace and security."

Asked whether it had been an imminent threat, the foreign secretary=20
said: "A sufficient threat for us to need to take military action. And
that was why we took that action.

"What we did say was 'This is a sufficient threat that if we continue to
sit on our hands, the threat will get worse, and there'll come a moment
where for sure Saddam will use these weapons against his own people and
against his neighbours, and not only be a threat to international peace
and security, but directly and very sinisterly affect international=20
peace and security."

Former foreign secretary Robin Cook has challenged the government again
today to hold an independent inquiry into decisions made in the run-up
to war.

He accused the government of exaggerating the threat posed by Saddam and
his WMD, of which he argued there has been no evidence so far.

Mr Cook, speaking on BBC Radio Scotland, said: "I have difficulty with
the idea that we [the British government] were right all along but,=20
cunningly, the Iraqis destroyed everything before the war.

"The idea that you would choose to destroy your weapons immediately=20
before the war seems to me implausible. If he didn't have them at the=20
end of the war, then he probably didn't have them for some time
beforehand, during the very time we were told he was such a menace and
that we had to go to war now and we couldn't wait a few months and let
Hans Blix finish his task.

Mr Cook said he wanted an independent inquiry looking at the "legality
of war". He added: "I think we need to make sure there is an independent
inquiry.

"The government has got it wrong. Governments do make mistakes. What=20
they should never do, though, is try and deny it or cover it up. We now
need the government to admit that the threat of Saddam was
over-exaggerated."

The Conservatives indicated last night that they may drop their
bipartisan approach to Iraq and add their voice to calls for an inquiry
from Mr Cook.

The shadow foreign secretary, Michael Ancram, sought to keep up the=20
pressure on Mr Blair over weapons of mass destruction - though he held
back from demanding an inquiry.

In a statement, Mr Ancram said: "There are questions to be answered. The
prime minister says that he has the answers in information not yet made
public. He should now come forward with those answers. Firstly, to=20
dampen down suspicions and, secondly, to show the people why he did what
he did.

"If he fails to do so, then he might not be able to avoid an inquiry,=20
but to call for one at this stage is premature."

Mr Cook accused Tony Blair of a "monumental blunder" while Labour=20
backbenchers demanded a Commons statement from the prime minister after
his return from the Evian G8 summit tomorrow.

Pressure for an inquiry was increased yesterday when Ms Short - who had
access to intelligence briefings in the run-up to the conflict as a=20
member of the war cabinet -accused Mr Blair of "duping" voters, MPs and
ministers about the level of threat posed by Saddam. Mr Straw said he=20
could "no evidence yet" for an independent inquiry. The extent of the=20
threat posed by Saddam was a question of "judgment", he added.

"Our case was a very clear and explicit one," Mr Straw said.

Ms Short, Mr Cook and others were "trying to change the basis on which
those judgments were made," he said.

"We never said that we are proposing to take military action on a=20
contingency of what we might find in the future.

"I hope very much we do find further evidence, but it will be further=20
evidence.

"Everybody, including, let me say, Robin Cook when he was foreign=20
secretary, accepted that the threat from Saddam Hussein was real and=20
that unless we did something about it, yes indeed he would continue to
pose what the security council said last November was a threat to=20
international peace and security."

Downing Street last night denied a report that officials had admitted=20
illicit weapons would never be found in Iraq, saying in a statement: "As
the prime minister has said, we have no doubt whatever that the evidence
of WMD will be there."

4.

SHORT: BLAIR LIED TO CABINET AND MADE SECRET PACT WITH U.S.
By Nicholas Watt & Michael White

** Tory threat to break ranks on Iraq **

The Guardian
June 2, 2003

http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,968597,00.html

Tony Blair is facing mounting pressure from across the House of Commons
to hold an independent inquiry into the Iraq war after Clare Short=20
levelled the incendiary allegation at the prime minister that he had=20
lied to the cabinet.

As an increasingly exasperated prime minister once again swept aside=20
calls for a public inquiry into the failure to uncover banned Iraqi=20
weapons, the former international development secretary accused Mr Blair
of bypassing the cabinet to agree a "secret" pact with George Bush to go
to war.

To compound the prime minister's difficulties - as MPs prepare to return
to Westminster tomorrow after the Whitsun recess - Robin Cook demanded
an independent inquiry into the "monumental blunder" by the government.

His criticisms were echoed last night by the Tories who said they were
giving "very serious consideration" to calls for an inquiry.

Michael Howard, the shadow chancellor, indicated to the BBC last night
that the Tories were considering abandoning their bipartisan approach to
Iraq because of fears that Downing Street might have "doctored" last=20
year's dossier on Iraq's banned weapons to strengthen the case for war.

The interventions by such senior figures from across the house gave=20
heart to Labour MPs who are planning to ambush the prime minister on=20
Wednesday at his weekly Commons appearance and during a subsequent=20
statement on the G8 summit.

They are demanding an emergency Commons statement after an unnamed=20
intelligence source told the BBC last week that Downing Street had=20
"sexed up" a dossier on Iraq's banned weapons.

Tam Dalyell, the father of the house who has a question to the prime=20
minister on Wednesday's Commons order paper, is expected to step up the
pressure by asking about Ms Short's accusation that he was deceitful to
the cabinet on three occasions.

In her BBC interview yesterday, she accused Mr Blair of:

· Agreeing in "secret" with Mr Bush at Camp David last September to go
to war - and then telling the cabinet that he would try to act as a=20
constraint on the US.

· Misleading the cabinet over Iraq's weapons capability - by "spinning"
the claim that Iraq could launch a chemical or biological attack within
45 minutes. "Where the spin came was the suggestion that it was all=20
weaponised, ready to go, immediately dangerous, likely to get into the
hands of al-Qaida, and therefore things were very very urgent."

· Falsely telling the cabinet and the world that Jacques Chirac, the
French president, would veto a second UN security council resolution=20
authorising war. The transcript of Mr Chirac's interview, which she=20
subsequently read, showed the prime minister's claim to be wrong.

Ms Short, who was widely criticised after she failed to carry out a=20
threat to resign on the eve of war, accused the prime minister of riding
roughshod over the conventions of cabinet. "It was all done in Tony=20
Blair's study ... The normal Whitehall systems to make big decisions=20
like this broke down and were very personalised in No 10."

Warning that civil servants and troops were ready to disobey an order to
go to war, Ms Short said that the prime minister swung round the
Whitehall machinery at the last moment when the attorney general
declared that military action would be legal. But she added: "I think,
given the attorney's advice, it was legal. But I think the route we got
there didn't honour the legality questions."

Some of her criticisms were echoed by the former foreign secretary,=20
Robin Cook, who demanded an independent inquiry into the failure to=20
uncover any weapons of mass destruction, despite the dire warnings from
Downing Street.

"It is beginning to look as if the government's committed a monumental
blunder," he told The World This Weekend on Radio 4.

"The government should admit it was wrong and they need to set up then a
thorough independent inquiry into how they got it wrong so that it never
happens again and we never again send British troops into action on the
basis of a mistake."

As a growing number of Labour MPs joined the clamour for an emergency=20
statement and a full investigation by the parliamentary intelligence=20
committee, an angry prime minister hit back at his critics.

Speaking en route to Evian, Mr Blair predicted that the next US-UK=20
intelligence dossier on Saddam Hussein's arsenal would make sceptical=20
voters "very well satisfied" that he was right. Expressing frustration
about what he sees as his critics' attempt to refight the war by other
means, Mr Blair insisted for the third time in as many days that
intelligence reports had not been doctored under political pressure and
would be vindicated.

Appealing for voters to be patient, he declared: "I have said throughout
that when this is put together, the evidence of the scientists and=20
witnesses, the investigations from the sites, people will be very well
satisfied."

The new dossier on which Downing Street pins its hopes will be produced
by US intelligence and weapons inspection teams which are now fanning=20
out over Iraq while colleagues work on humanitarian aid and reconstruction.

5.

POWELL'S DOUBTS OVER CIA INTELLIGENCE ON IRAQ PROMPTED HIM
TO SET UP SECRET REVIEW
By Suzanne Goldenberg & Richard Norton-Taylor

** Specialists removed questionable evidence about weapons
from draft of secretary of state's speech to UN **

The Guardian
June 2, 2003

http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,968581,00.html

Fresh evidence emerged last night that Colin Powell, the US secretary of
state, was so disturbed about questionable American intelligence on=20
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction that he assembled a secret team to=20
review the information he was given before he made a crucial speech to
the UN security council on February 5.

Mr Powell conducted a full-dress rehearsal of the speech on the eve of
the session at his suite in the Waldorf Astoria, his New York base when
he is on UN business, according to the authoritative US News and World
Report.

Much of the initial information for Mr Powell's speech to the UN was=20
provided by the Pentagon, where Paul Wolfowitz, the US deputy defence=20
secretary, set up a special unit, the Office of Special Plans, to=20
counter the uncertainty of the CIA's intelligence on Iraq.

Mr Powell's team removed dozens of pages of alleged evidence about=20
Iraq's banned weapons and ties to terrorists from a draft of his speech,
US News and World Report says today. At one point, he became so angry at
the lack of adequate sourcing to intelligence claims that he declared:
"I'm not reading this. This is bullshit," according to the magazine.

Presented with a script for his speech, Mr Powell suspected that
Washington hawks were "cherry picking", the US magazine Newsweek also=20
reports today. Greg Theilmann, a recently retired state department=20
intelligence analyst directly involved in assessing the Iraqi threat,=20
says that inside the Bush administration "there is a lot of sorrow and
anger at the way intelligence was misused".

The Bush administration, under increased scrutiny for failing to find=20
Saddam Hussein's arsenals eight weeks after occupying Baghdad, yesterday
confronted the damaging new allegations on the misuse of intelligence to
bolster the case for war.

The gaps in the case against Saddam have become a matter for public=20
debate only within the last few days. They have also become an issue of
credibility for the CIA and the Bush administration as it begins to=20
assemble a case against Iran and its nuclear programme.

Yesterday, a senior Bush administration official told reporters
travelling with the president to the Evian summit that Washington was=20
not alone in its pursuit of Saddam's arsenal. "We have to remember that
there's a long history of accusation of the weapons of mass destruction
programmes in Iraq. A lot of what is unresolved about the Iraqi weapons
of mass destruction programme comes from the United Nations, from=20
Unscom, from Unmovic [teams of weapons inspectors] and, of course, from
US and other intelligence," the official said.

The official also said that US forces in Iraq had not yet had the time
to process the hundreds of documents captured since Saddam's fall, or=20
track down the people with information on his weapons programmes.

On Friday, the CIA director, George Tenet, was forced to issue a
statement denying the agency doctored intelligence reports.

"Our role is to call it like we see it, to tell policymakers what we=20
know, what we don't know, what we think, and what we base it on. That's
the code we live by," the statement said.

During a series of meetings at CIA headquarters last February, initiated
by Mr Powell, the secretary of state was reported to have reviewed the
intelligence reports on Saddam, his arsenal of chemical and nuclear=20
weapons, and his possible links with al-Qaida. The ostensible purpose of
the exercise, carried out over four days, was to decide which should be
included in his address.

However, a common theme of the meetings was the failure of the CIA and
other intelligence agencies to produce a convincing case against Saddam.
Despite the increasingly belligerent statements from the
administration's hawks, the CIA had disturbingly little proof.

Even more damaging, many of the assertions bandied about were based on
reports that were speculative or impossible to corroborate - but seized
on because they suited the agenda of the hawks in the administration.=20
Ambiguities and nuance were left aside.

One claim from the original dossier that could not be proved involved=20
the supply of sensitive software from Australia that would have allowed
Baghdad to gather sensitive information about the topography of the US.
However, the CIA could not establish for Mr Powell whether the software
had been delivered to Iraq.

Although the issue of flawed CIA intelligence has caused concern about
the agency's ability to gather evidence on potential threats to the US,
it did not appear to have shaken the widespread belief that the war on
Iraq was a just war.

"The day that I saw those nine and 10- year-old boys released from a=20
prison, the day I saw the mass graves uncovered, it was ample testimony
of the brutality and repressiveness of this regime," the Republican=20
senator John McCain told ABC television yesterday. "It was the day that
I believe our liberation of Iraq was fully vindicated."


Continued in next email



=== === === === === === ===3D === ===
Thank you for considering my awareness raising habit as a practical way
to honor our capacity to rock and roll with life ....
eg: I send these so that we might better see and UTILIZE
opportunities to jump in and make things better when we can.
... Again, just let me know if you want off this list
(or just off the political list) -
via chaliser@aol.com (Chris Pringer)
== === == = == === ==
Citizen Actvist Preventative Health Maintenance (anti-Burn-Out) Class=20
Topic Summary
(at http://members.aol.com/Chaliser/Qs4Disillusionment.html)
=== ===